



For some thinkers, the failure of either the princi-
ple of non-contradiction, or that of the excluded-
middle, means that the corresponding theoretical
developments are based on ‘trembling grounds’.
But things are what they are, and the principles
fail in many cases. Enric Trillas, [19, p. 1]
27.1 Introduction
Even when they are defined with precision, one can often read and hear judg-
ments about the vagueness of heuristics in debates about heuristic reasoning.1
This opinion is not just frequent but also quite reasonable. In fact, during the
1990s, there was a certain controversy concerning this topic that confronted
two of the leading groups in the field of heuristic reasoning research, each of
whom held very different perspectives. In the present text, we will focus on
two of the papers published in Psychological Review, wherein the arguments
of each of these groups were presented: on the one hand, Kahneman and
Tversky (1996) [10], and, on the other, Gigerenzer ([3, 4, 5]) and Gigeren-
zer and Murray ([2]). Essentially, there are two reasons for carrying out an
analysis of this controversy in this article: Firstly, because in the subsequent
literature there is no analysis of the impact of those (allegedly opposed) posi-
tions on the development of both groups’ research programmes, especially in
the case of the Adaptive Behaviour Cognition (ABC) research group at the
Max Planck Institute for Human Development. The second reason is related
to the perspective that will be proposed here to interpret those results. Ac-
cording to that perspective, if we take into account the scientific production
1 The concept of ‘heuristics’ has been utilised in various disciplines and lines of
research. This explains, at least partially, the plurality of perspectives from which
certain questions are approached, such as the nature of the cognitive functions
behind heuristics, whether they are used the same way in different knowledge
domains, whether they guide a course of action in the same way as our acquisition
of knowledge does in a specific environment, etc. Here we will try to demonstrate
that the semantic or conceptual pluralism of the term ‘heuristics’ derives not just
from the uses it acquires, but also from the different types of evidence that the
process it refers to requires.
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of Trillas regarding the meaning of terms such as ‘vagueness’ and ‘fuzziness’,
there would be reason to believe that Gigerenzer’s [5] controverted response
to Kahneman and Tversky allows, even today, for new interpretations to be
made. This is the objective of the present paper. The interpretation proposed
here intends to be evaluated taking into account whether or not it is relevant
to explore the social dimension of heuristic reasoning. Nowadays, what we
know as social heuristics are the subject of much debate and research.
According to the interpretation we propose, when Gigerenzer objected
that the heuristic-and-biases program of Kahneman and Tversky was based
on a vague conception of heuristics, he was not merely stating the truth but
was also detecting a research niche of great interest.2 In spite of the fact
that, as far as we know, that niche has not been sufficiently explored. It
is not the same to state that heuristics are vague if the author who makes
this assertion is in favour of a semantic perspective (for example, because
he or she supports a theory of truth degrees) as if the author is in favour
of epistemicism in his or her perspective on vagueness. Nevertheless, before
exploring those perspectives and the way in which they could affect the notion
of heuristics, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive interpretation of
the debate between those psychologists of reasoning in 1996.
27.2 Reasoning with Content-Blind Norms?
If we could travel in time and go back to the date in which the controversy
started – for the moment, therefore, we will not take into account those
significant publications that have appeared subsequently – we could state,
in general, that Kahneman and Tversky consider that the main goal of the
heuristics-and-biases program has been to understand the cognitive processes
2 Newell and Simon (1972) [15] used the term for the first time to denote pro-
cedures for solving problems in an easier way than using complex algorithms.
Nevertheless they insisted that this procedure does not guarantee that a solution
(correct or otherwise) will be obtained. Two years later, Tversky and Kahneman
published “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases”, in which they
used the term to refer to normal procedures for guiding probabilistic judgment
(their estimation); therefore, they also related it with the notion of “intuitive
statistics”. However, for others, as is the case with Gigerenzer and Goldstein
(2002) [8] (whose research program is generally presented as opposed to that of
Kahneman and Tversky), the term refers to a specific type of strategy used to
adapt to the environment. Although these strategies are not always correct –
as occasionally better-suited ones can be found – what is important to the ABC
group is to analyse the purported heuristics, to identify their ecological rational-
ity via (computational) modelling that accounts for how those heuristics exploit
the pattern of information in a determined context, and finally to show to what
extent this heuristic procedure has produced suitable inferences.
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that produce both valid and invalid judgments.3 That is how Gigerenzer
described the research objective of the heuristic-and-biases program. Here
we do not propose to make any detailed discourse analysis. For example,
we will avoid examining if the one describing his opponents’ program is in-
curring, or not, in the straw man fallacy.4 In order to satisfy the objectives
announced in the previous section, it will suffice to detect the main differ-
ences between both research groups. According to that initial presentation,
the second group would be characterised by their proposal of models of cog-
nitive processes that predict when frequency and probability judgments are
valid and when they are invalid according to certain norms and the fact that
they also explain why. Indeed, this last question is considered essential in or-
der to avoid both vagueness and excessively strict norms in the debate about
what constitutes a good question and a satisfactory answer in psychological
research on reasoning. The application of both criteria – narrow norms and
vagueness – could produce a notion of heuristics that explains “too little and
too much”. Gigerenzer constructs a complex argument from a set of simple
arguments which, taken into account individually, can be described as two
reasons.
The norms for evaluating reasoning are too narrowly drawn
Vague heuristics have directed attention away from detailed models
of cognitive processes (. . .) and toward post-hoc accounts of alleged
errors
Therefore
Judgments deviating from these norms will be mistakenly interpreted
as ‘cognitive illusions’
3 In the literature on heuristics and cognitive biases, Kahneman, Tversky and
Slovic’s [12] programs and those of Gigerenzer [7] and Todd, Gigerenzer et al.
[18], are generally presented as being in opposition, even if this opposition is in
a certain sense a question of emphasis. A significant difference certainly exists
in the fact that while the former investigate how the use of heuristics and biases
produces mistakes, the latter believe heuristics make us more intelligent, which
is why some authors ask whether they could even make us kinder. This last
question would not be taken very seriously until the publication Sunstein [17].
In general, it can be stated that both groups believe that the use of heuristics
gives rise to relatively valuable judgments within determined contexts. They also
agree that determining the errors caused by the use of a heuristic in a determined
context requires empirical research. Another identifying trait both programs
have in common is that they take heuristics not as declarative propositions but
as procedures that can be applied to very different problems that in fact present
an unlimited variety of contents.
4 A straw man is a common type of argument and is an informal fallacy based on
the misrepresentation of an opponent’s argumentation or interpretation.
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Gigerenzer refers to and describes several facts to justify his reasons and
illustrate his main argument. The first one consists of appealing to a certain
research practice common to specialists whom we consider to have a certain
academic authority in their field:
The first issue on which Kahneman and Tversky and I disagree concerns
the question of what counts as sound statistical reasoning. Most practic-
ing statisticians start by investigating the content of a problem, work out
a set of assumptions, and, finally, build a statistical model based on these
assumptions.” [5, p. 592]
The author then insists on the fact that, in spite of the aforementioned
practice, in Kahneman and Tversky’s work a quite peculiar fact is observed
that is described in the following terms:
“The heuristics-and-biases program starts at the opposite end. A convenient
statistical principal, such as the conjunction rule or Baye’s rule, is chosen as
normative, and some real-world content is filled in afterward, on the assump-
tion that only structure maters. The content of the problem is not analyzed
in building a normative model, nor are the specific assumptions people make
about the situation.” [5, p. 592]
With the aim of providing an example on which the previous objection can
be based, and thus, in order to clarify the referred facts, Gigerenzer presents
the results obtained by his colleagues concerning the famous Linda problem.
He describes them in the following way:
For instance, consider the Linda problem, in which participants read a de-
scription that suggests that Linda is a feminist and are asked “Which is more
probable? (a) Linda is a bank teller [T], or (b) Linda is a bank teller and
active in the feminist movement [T&F].” Tversky and Kahneman’ [21] norm
of sound reasoning here is the conjunction rule, and only the conjunction rule,
which leads them to conclude that answering T&F is a fallacy.” [5, p. 592]
Gigerenzer maintains that, when his colleagues describe in that way the
results they obtained for the Linda problem, they do so because they apply
an interpretation criterion based on narrow norms. And he adds that there
are two reasons to believe that the application of those norms is (excessively
and unnecessarily) narrow:
1. Probability theory is imposed as a norm for a single event (whether Linda
is a bank teller); this would be considered misguided by those statisticians
who hold that probability theory is about repeated events.
2. The norm is applied in a content-blind way, with the assumption that
judgments about what counts as sound reasoning may ignore content and
context.
The counterargument used in this article to oppose the use of narrow
norms to analyse the application of probability laws to singular events is as
follows: because an adequate context can be created to introduce this norm
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and obtain the indicated results, it is therefore not contradictory to assume
that an adequate context could be described to introduce the norm in such
a way that it does not lead interviewees to use the conjunction fallacy.
This counterargument presents a hypothetical situation in which the two
fundamental notions of this polemical debate are used: single-event probabil-
ities and content-blind norms, in order to reach a conclusion: the conjunction
fallacy is not universally applicable as a sound reasoning norm. This could
be stated in more precise terms: the application of probability laws to any
type of propositions about singular events is not a good criterion to deter-
mine cognitive illusions because the norm or the criterion presumably used
by people to solve the problem is not universally applied as a norm of sound
reasoning.
As other scenarios could be considered that means other contexts linked
to a different exposition of the case information, the strongest objection
by Gigerenzer has to do with the (equivocal) assumption that there are
content-blind norms in reasoning. His counterargument confronts the results
of Kahneman and Tversky’s with the support of two reasons: the application
of single-event probabilities concerning any circumstance (i.e. single event
propositions) is not well defined if the statistical principle is imposed as a
norm, that means – and this would be the second reason –, if the content is
not analysed, thus applying content-blind norms.
The second reason based on the idea that content-blind norms might ex-
ist, has more weight from an argumentative point of view. After all, if the
meaning of ‘probable’ cannot be reduced to the case (e.g. to the application
and meaning) of the conjunction fallacy this is due to the plurality of accep-
tations that the term ‘plausible’ has for all of us. The application of narrow
norms such as interpretation criterion for the obtained results is inadvisable
because people do not reason using content-blind norms.
In the case of the example, if we refer to the Oxford English Dictionary,
interviewees might be reasoning taking into account, among others, one of
these acceptations of probability:
(i) “plausible”
(ii) “having an appearance of truth”
(iii) “that may in view of present evidence be reasonably expected to
happen”
Gigerenzer’s counterargument is summoned with a determining persuasive
charge when he states that:
“These legitimate meanings in natural language have little if anything to do
with mathematical probability. Similarly, the meaning of and in natural lan-
guage rarely matches that a logical AND. The phrase T&F can be understood
as the conditional “If Linda is a bank teller, then she is active in the feminist
movement.” Note that this interpretation would not concern and therefore
could not violate the conjunction rule. (. . .) Semantic inferences – how one
infers the meaning of polysemous terms such as probable form the content of
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a sentence (or the broader context of communication) in practically no time –
are extraordinary intelligent processes. They are not reasoning fallacies. No
computer program, to say nothing of the conjunction rule, has yet mastered
this form of intelligence. Significant cognitive processes such as these will
be overlooked and even misclassified as “cognitive illusions” by content-blind
norms.” [5, p. 593]
Up to this point, we agree with Gigerenzer’s counterargument. The
psychologist uses an argument that coordinates two simple ones. Taken sep-
arately, they can be considered two good reasons as they lead to a represen-
tation of human reasoning that, apparently, fits better with the practice of
ordinary reasoning. In the case of this latter fact, it is crucial to understand
why it is persuasive. Nevertheless, our disagreement starts precisely in the
point where this author accuses Kahneman and Tvesky’s proposal of being
vague. I would contend that Gigerenzer does not notice the fact that his
own proposal might be understood as an invitation to think about the role
of vagueness in ordinary reasoning. This is precisely the point where, in my
view, Trillas’ scientific production seems to me to be essential to carry out an
interpretation based on arguments. According to the interpretation I am go-
ing to suggest, if I am not mistaken, in this important controversy a perfect
opportunity was missed to explore the meaning and function of vagueness
in our reasoning processes. Even though the year 1996 now seems quite far
away, in my view, testing this interpretation is still relevant for current re-
search on heuristics and, in particular, in the field that is related to the social
dimension of this type of ordinary reasoning.
27.3 The Heuristics-and-Biases Program
We started with the affirmation that, even when defined with precision, in
debates concerning heuristic reasoning it is frequent to find judgements con-
cerning the vagueness of heuristics, and we also stated that this opinion is
not only frequent but even seems reasonable. Research on heuristic reason-
ing as a type of cognitive process has developed in an especially significant
way from 1970 onwards. In spite of the fact that many years have gone by
since 1996, it is difficult to find a publication where the causes related to the
vagueness of the heuristic-and-biases program are better described. There
would be at least six reasons why that program is vague or even too vague
to count as an explanation of the investigated phenomenon (heuristic reason-
ing). That program would be vague because of the following reasons and/or
circumstances:
• The reluctance to specify precise and falsifiable process models
• Too vague to clarify the antecedent conditions that elicit various heuristics
• Too vague to work out the relationship between heuristics
• Connection between narrow norms and the absence of process models
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• Kahneman and Tversky did not start with the content, but with a statis-
tical rule
• They assumed that there is only one correct answer to be determined
mechanically by plugging in values and computing outcomes
Some of these reasons would constitute a direct cause of the vagueness of
the program, and others could be considered a consequence of the applica-
tion of a program where the explanations concerning heuristic reasoning are
excessively vague.
Table 27.1 The heuristic-and-biases program is too vague
Causes of vagueness Consequences of the vagueness
Kahneman and Tversky did not Too vague to clarify the antecedent
start with the content but with a conditions that elicit various heuristics.
statistical rule. Too vague to work out the relationship
The reluctante to specify precise between heuristics.
and falsifiable process models. The assumption that there is only one
Connection between narrow norms correct answer to be determined
and the absence of process models. mechanically by plugging in values and
computing outcomes.
In the light of what has been previously stated, Gigerenzer affirms that in
the analysed program there are methodological factors wherein not only vague
criteria concur (e.g. they are not sufficiently demarcated), but also that they
lead to a vague explanation concerning the described phenomena. Before
explaining why I consider it important to demarcate the sense of the concept
of vagueness in this debate, I will briefly refer to the range of problems (e.g.
social, epistemic, learning-related, etc.) encompassed by research on heuristic
reasoning. Only in this way it is possible to judge whether or not it is relevant
to turn to this debate in order to analyse the use of the term ‘vagueness’.
With the help of some graphics, we will present the most relevant conclusions
reached by Gigerenzer while analysing Kahneman and Tversky’s program. It
must not be forgotten that the objective of the program of the ABC research
group at the Max Planck Institute is to present a conception of heuristic
reasoning which is less vague than the previous one. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to evaluate if they have succeeded or not.
27.3.1 Challenges Associated with Heuristic
Reasoning
For some authors, the study of heuristics must be related to the goal of
clarifying our theories about the world (e.g. popular conceptions about the
laws of physics, folk conceptions, etc.). This is precisely the form it takes
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in the work of Baron (1993), who introduced the term ‘moral heuristics’ to
describe the norms that make up our na¨ıve morality. Barons contribution was
fundamental as it later instigated a perspective on moral judgment in which
it was described as being associated with two different cognitive systems:
an intuitive system and a rational system [9]. According to Sunstein [17],
heuristics rely on system I, the intuitive system, which is why they are quick,
do not demand a great cognitive effort, are in a certain sense inaccessible
to the conscience, and entail a parallel process which some have related to
emotions [9]. If heuristics are a type of strategy related to the natural capacity
to value and to make judgments in order to produce an estimation or a
prediction, how can we identify them? In Kahneman and Tversky, their
detection is possible as they are identified with strategies that take the form
of mental shortcuts used unconsciously (as there is no deliberate will to use
these strategies) by people to solve specific problems.
Fig. 27.1 One of the strongest Gigerenzer’s objection: the model is inaccurate
In 1974, Tversky and Kahneman maintained that people trust in a lim-
ited number of heuristic principles that reduce the complex tasks of assigning
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgment operations. Gigeren-
zer’s research program can be understood as a contribution to the set of
controversies that the cited publication generated. According to what we
have seen, their main objective is to detect these simple and frugal heuris-
tics, to determine what role they play in each realm of knowledge and to
describe their function without isolating them from the context in which
they are used. The fundamental trait of the ABC Groups project focuses on
a simple idea: that in the real world heuristics generally function well. De-
spite this simplicity, this is one of the most relevant objections to the early
works on heuristics, as many of the findings on the purported cognitive errors
people commit can be understood as consequences, i.e., diagnoses, constructs
generated by the experimental design of unfamiliar problems, and their per-
formance is the description of the use or application of heuristics as if these
were somehow indiscriminate [6, 18]. An example of this critique is the as-
sessment made of the acceptations of the availability and reess heuristics the
use of which is presented ad hoc.
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Fig. 27.2 Another famous objection about the model: the difficulty of making
measurements and/or improve existing ones
Fig. 27.3 In 1996 Gigerenzer argued that the fundamental weakness of the
heuristics-and-biases program is the notion of ‘representativeness’
In response to the aforementioned objections, in 2002 Kahneman and Fred-
erick published Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intu-
itive judgment, a work in which they maintained that heuristics are mental
shortcuts used when we are interested in evaluating what they call a “tar-
get” attribute. In these circumstances, people generally substitute a heuristic
attribute of the object (that is presented to us) because it is easier to man-
age. Heuristics would therefore operate through substitution processes for an
attribute.
27.3.2 Collective Tools for Discussion and Social
Change
In the programmes that we have mentioned so far, one of the consistent
defining characteristics of heuristics is the belief that they are not declara-
tive propositions but rather procedures that can be applied to very different
problems and these are precisely the ones that present an unlimited variety
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of contents. However, the research results of several authors (some of them
members of the ABC research group) can be used to establish a coordinated
counterargument on this point. Using brief statements, I will enumerate the
works that I have selected indicating very concisely why they could be used
as counterarguments.
(A) Reasoning heuristically based on (the content of) what is
learned.
Rieskamp [9] offers an interpretation of the learning processes by which this
could be modelled (progressively) using the same selection strategies em-
ployed in learning. The results of his research make a clear appeal to the
position of those who maintain that people are equipped with a repertoire of
different cognitive strategies, and that we simply make use of them when we
are called to make estimations or decisions. Learning precisely how to select
strategies (which would improve and modify the results of our learning) would
turn this perspective around, not just because it would introduce dynamism
to this process, but because the subjective expectations (of the learner) would
play a fundamental role in our heuristic reasoning (e.g., thereby selecting the
most successful option according to the representation of the problem, re-
cursively modifying the selection of applicable heuristics as a function of the
learning opportunities experienced, etc.). Kunda’s classic article [22] on mo-
tivated reasoning sheds light on the research context in which Rieskamp’s
research can be framed, beyond the ABC research program on ecological
rationality.
It appears that learning is an important factor that needs to be taken
into account when interpreting inferences in a situation in which outcome
feedback is provided. Therefore the conclusions regarding how people make
their inferences depend on the provided learning opportunity. Depending on
whether the learning opportunities are sufficient to allow people to adapt to
the specific environment, conclusions might differ concerning whether people
make their inferences adaptatively [9, p. 274].
(B) Reasoning heuristically based on (the content of) defeasible
beliefs.
Morado and Leah’s perspective in the article Rationality, logic, and heuris-
tics refutes Gigerenzer’s vision of the role of logic not just when reasoning
heuristically but also when selecting precise heuristics from our particular
toolbox. Given that this selection depends on basic beliefs, and given that
the structure of sociocultural contexts (to use Gigerenzer’s terminology) in
which our life unfolds can eventually bring about in us contradictory beliefs,
our heuristic reasoning can be understood as part of a paraconsistent sys-
tem geared towards processing information that arises from contexts, from
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situations. Belief should be added to the concept of “context” in the ecolog-
ical rationality model: our contexts are contexts of beliefs (e.g. which we are
in, have been in, observe others to be in, etc.).
Human inferential systems are paraconsistent in the sense that we have
contradictory beliefs yet reasoning continues through the use of heuristics
without collapsing into triviality. [. . .] Many heuristics are content-specific or
domain-specific. Some heuristics are learned from experience and many suc-
cessful executions are due to familiarity with contextual parameters. These
parameters are important if an agent is to react rationally to highly contex-
tual “environment variables”, for instance those involved in natural language
processing. [. . .] Heuristics often exemplify “nonmonotonic reasoning” be-
cause in many cases they produce defeasible beliefs, retractable in the face
of new evidence. (Morado and Leah [14]).
(C) Reasoning heuristically based on (the change and content of)
the heuristics of folk psychology.
If the analysis of the use of heuristics has to do with learning, the results in
folk psychology research should be integrated within this vast set as through
it we make use of a type of popular causation with which we also make use
of our heuristics. This kind of popular causation may not allow us to make
predictions or explanations in a strict sense (i.e. because they give reason
to believe that something may occur or because they explain why something
has occurred), but it does allow us to establish existent causal relationships
between states of belief, desires, fears, etc.
And if this is true, then heuristic idealisations of common sense should be
evaluated based on the successful or unsuccessful intentional predictions they
lead to, no by the truth or falsehood of a description of reality that they
do not make. [. . .] Of course, the history of our folk psychology has not
concluded. The patrons of social interaction are in a permanent state of flux;
also, there is no doubt that scientific development has a certain influence on
the avatars of common sense. [13, p. 239]
Both the learning of strategies (whether later applied to the act itself of
learning heuristics in determined contexts or not) and the learning (simulated
or not) of folk psychology heuristics justify a review of the classical theories
on heuristics from a social viewpoint. It is our view that the descriptive and
normative perspective of heuristics cannot be reduced to the discussion of
whether moral heuristics exist or whether these can be catalogued to make
their use, for example, in the world of judicial argumentation more under-
standable. Because, even so, the task of learning how we forge our heuristics
socially, whether or not these are unfair from an epistemic viewpoint, or
whether social heuristics can be transformed using other socially constructed
heuristics, thus relegating them to dialectics (where Aristotle placed them)
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would still have to be undertaken in order to analyse them as (social and
collective) tools for discussion and social change.
27.4 Coda
The acquisition of beliefs through learning processes, distinguishing states
and relations of dependency between belief states, learning folk mental cau-
sation models, etc., they are all activities through which we reason with
contents and, at the same time, they are activities through which we actively
attend to the formation of cognitive processes. I have selected the Gigeren-
zer vs. Kahneman and Tversky controversy because I consider that, in some
way, it is the result of considering vagueness in its relationship with tempo-
rality but not with the inherent vagueness of propositions, of the terms used
in natural language, of the diffuse sets that people employ to reason and
to use our socially constructed heuristics (through learning processes, folk
mental causation theories for beliefs acquisition, etc.). What is missing in
this controversy – which took place a decade after the publication of Zadeh’s
Fuzzy sets and applications (1987) – is a reflection on vagueness. Gigerenzer
assumes that vagueness and lack of precision are negative terms. He does
not think that vagueness might be a characteristic of heuristic reasoning but
rather that it is (a) a pernicious property characteristic of Kahneman and Ter-
sky’s heuristic-and-biases program, and (b) a negative consequence derived
from the application of their program to the study of heuristic reasoning.
Against this conception of vagueness, other authors offer a description of hu-
man reasoning as a process that could not be understood without fuzziness
as a principal trait of linguistic concepts. If I am not mistaken, this would
be the case of Trillas.
Talking acquires full development with the typically social human manifes-
tation called storytelling with, at least, its two modalities of discourse and
narrative that, either in different oral, spatial hand signs, or written forms,
not only support storytelling but, along with abstraction, could be consid-
ered among the highest expressions of the brain capability of thinking, surely
reinforced during evolution by the physical possibilities of the human body
to tackle and to consider the possible usefulness of objects. Storytelling can
be roughly described as constructing chains of sentences organized with some
purpose. Thinking and storytelling are merely names for abstract concepts
covering the totally of those human actions designated by the verbs ‘to think’,
‘to tell’, and ‘to discuss’, of which only the two last can be directly observed
by the layperson. [20]
These descriptions of human reasoning and of such common operations as
dialogue, narration, telling (something to someone) are of enormous interest.
This is so because taking them and the ideas that they set in motion as
a starting point, the existing production in the field of the psychology of
reasoning concerning heuristics could be re-interpreted. The use and function
References 293
of heuristics makes sense precisely because precision and certainty cannot be
reached acritically by making predictions before seeing how people throw the
dice and what problems each of us solve in the most complex game of all,
that of communication. In that complex and daily game, the majority of
inference processes are of a semantic than a syntactic nature. The meaning
of sets (of the dices thrown into the air) should not be dissociated from
the fuzzy traits implicit in the premises. Essentially, I think that in this
controversy conjectures are made prematurely. It would have been desirable
to establish an acceptation of vagueness in some sense. Saying that the
Kahneman and Tversky’s program is too vague because it explains too much
could be used as an argument against Gigerenzer himself as the acceptation
of vagueness he uses is too vague. But this is a secondary matter, related to
the analysis of arguments. What I consider more important is the analysis
of the consequences of his argument (which I consider to be weak) because it
hindered his analysis of, at the very least, the following problems: (a) what
is the function of heuristics in approximate reasoning, where imprecision and
uncertainty are intrinsic attributes; (b) are heuristics intrinsically vague?; (c)
is the use people make of certain heuristics in certain situations predictable?
Even taking into account the great value of the subsequent contributions of
the ABC group and their ecological rationality program, I consider that there
is still much to do in this field. And I think that as Trillas says “at this point,
human capability of conjecturing appears as something fundamental”.
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